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ABSTRACT
Concept Identification and Formation in Adolescents
Diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder
Jonathan Sterling Beck
Department of Psychology, BYU
Master of Science
Abstraction is an inductive process through which specific details become united by a
general concept. Abstraction incorporates two sub-skills: concept identification which involves
recognizing patterns created by an external agent, and concept formation which is more difficult,
requiring independent creation of a schema to organize information. Impairments in concept
identification and formation are theorized to underlie a variety of practical difficulties of
individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; e.g., failure to generalize learning in one
context to a similar, but new context). However, past research has yielded mixed results, with
some finding significant impairment and others finding intact concept identification and
formation. Contradictory findings may be due to differences in assessment methodology.
We assessed concept identification and formation abilities using the Delis-Kaplan
Executive Function System (D-KEFS) Sorting task. We hypothesized that (1) we would replicate
previous findings of intact concept identification but impaired concept formation in individuals
with ASD (Minshew et al., 2002); (2) impairments in concept formation would remain even after
accounting for differences in IQ, working memory ability, and test anxiety; and (3) worse
impairments would be associated with more severe autism symptoms. The sample consisted of
27 high-functioning (IQ > 80) adolescents with ASD and 27 age- (M 14.8 years) and IQ- (M
102.8) matched typically-developing controls. One-way ANOVAs explored group differences on
task performance variables. As hypothesized, our sample demonstrated intact concept
identification abilities, F(1, 52) = 2.90, p = 0.095, but impaired concept formation abilities, F(1,
52) = 6.53, p = 0.01. A linear regression analysis revealed that working memory ability and test
anxiety were not significant predictors of concept formation abilities. After accounting for IQ in
a regression model, our hypothesis was partly borne out in that individuals with ASD continued
to show impairment in concept formation, yet at trend-level significance (p = 0.058). Two-tailed
Pearson correlations revealed no significant correlations between a measure of autism
symptomatology and concept formation or concept identification ability.
Our findings add to a growing body of research showing a dissociation between concept
identification and concept formation abilities in individuals with ASD. This dissociation existing
at trend-level significance after statistically controlling for IQ suggests that it may exist across
levels of cognitive functioning in ASD. Our finding that concept formation ability was not
significantly associated with a measure autism symptomatology somewhat weakens the
theoretical significance of concept formation deficits in ASD.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, abstraction, concept formation, concept identification
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Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a behaviorally-defined neurodevelopmental disorder
that manifests through two primary impairments: (1) deficits in social communication (verbal
and nonverbal) and social interaction, as well as (2) restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviors
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). At the time of diagnosis, the clinician typically
assigns the individual to one of three severity levels: Level 1indicating a need for support, Level
2 indicating a need for substantial support, or Level 3 indicating a need for very substantial
support (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Between and within these levels, the autism
spectrum is extraordinarily heterogeneous in terms of etiology (Newschaffer et al., 2007;
Betancur, 2011), clinical presentation (Simonoff et al., 2008; Mannion, Leader, & Healy, 2013),
and prognosis (Howlin, 2005). This heterogeneity is a major obstacle to making progress in the
study of ASD (Georgiades et al., 2013). However, such progress is urgently needed given the
increasing prevalence of ASD (now 1 in every 68 children is affected, and 1 in every 42 boys
(Baio, 2014)) and the fact that outcomes for adults with ASD are grim, with young adults with
ASD employed at rates even lower than those of other disability groups (Shattuck et al., 2012;
Roux et al., 2013).
The Search for a Primary Deficit
In order to cut through the heterogeneity and aid progress in understanding ASD,
researchers have long attempted to identify a core problem, or “primary deficit”, that underlies
both of the diagnostic impairments (i.e. social deficits and restricted, repetitive behaviors) (Frith,
2003). Proposed primary deficits have included a range of biological and cognitive problems,
amongst others. Proposed biological problems include genetic mutations (Betancur, 2011),
immune dysfunction (Onore, Careaga, & Ashwood, 2012), structural brain abnormalities
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(Amaral, Schumann, & Nordahl, 2008), and functional brain abnormalities (Assaf et al., 2010).
Proposed cognitive problems include executive functioning deficits (Ozonoff, 1995a), complex
information processing deficits (Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997), and weak central
coherence (Happé & Frith, 2006). Additional proposed primary deficits include sensory
processing problems (Ornitz, 1989) and abnormal patterns of arousal (Dawson & Lewy, 1989).
No primary deficit has yet been found that exists across the entire autism spectrum.
The challenge of finding the primary deficit of ASD thus remains, and ASD continues to
be defined in terms of observable behaviors. While biology, especially neurobiology, constitutes
the most basic possible level of dysfunction, and likely future treatments and cures (e.g.,
pharmaceuticals, gene therapy) will target this level, abnormal cognition can be conceptualized
as a bridge between biology and behavior (Minshew & Goldstein, 1998). Clarifying dysfunction
at the intermediary cognitive level (e.g., at the level of executive functioning or information
processing) will likely help interpret biological abnormalities in ASD which underlie cognitive
dysfunction. If no unifying primary deficit of ASD can be found at the intermediary cognitive
level, then arguably no primary deficit will ever be found at the more complex level of biology.
We turn our focus then to the cognitive problems theorized to be at the root of autism.
Although many have already investigated the three aforementioned cognitive problems
associated with ASD (i.e., executive functioning deficits, complex information processing
deficits, and weak central coherence), there remain many unanswered questions. The umbrella
term of executive function is applied to any higher-order cognitive process that involves
managing mental resources (i.e. lower-level sub-processes) to achieve a goal (Elliott, 2003).
Executive functions are theorized to fit into six categories: inhibition, working memory,
contextual memory, planning, fluency (or generativity), and cognitive flexibility (or set-shifting)
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(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). Not surprisingly given the heterogeneity in the ASD population,
widely-varying profiles of executive dysfunction have been associated with autism (Hill, 2004a,
2004b). Complex information processing is conceptualized as being downstream from simple
information processing, and it involves different cognitive abilities depending on the domain
involved (e.g., a complex memory task recruits different mental resources than a complex
language task; Minshew et al., 1997; Minshew & Goldstein, 1998). In contrast to executive
functioning research that seeks to identify cognitive domains that are impaired in autism,
research supporting the complex information processing deficit theory of autism seeks to identify
whether, across cognitive domains, there is impairment once the task reaches a certain level of
complexity (Minshew et al., 1997). There is significant evidence in support of the cognitive
information processing deficit theory (Minshew et al., 1997), but there is countering evidence
that individuals with ASD have intact performance on complex items and impaired performance
on simple items of the same learning task (Solomon et al., 2014). Weak central coherence is
defined as a preference for the local part over the global whole (Happé & Frith, 2006). In other
words, individuals with weak central coherence cannot see the forest for the trees. A review of
over fifty studies found that individuals with ASD show a clear attentional and processing bias
towards local details, but there is mixed evidence that individuals with ASD have a global
processing deficit (Happé & Frith, 2006). In light of past research, it seems unlikely that any of
these three cognitive constructs is the primary deficit of autism.
Concept Formation as a Candidate Primary Deficit
Despite evidence that these three theories are distinct in some ways, there is also reason
to believe that these three theories have areas of overlap. Weak central coherence can be thought
of as a problem with transitioning successfully from processing information about simple parts to
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processing the complex whole, which in turn can be thought of as an executive dysfunction in
that an inability to process complex information hinders goal-directed behavior. Some have
identified this area of overlap as a deficit in abstraction, the inductive process through which the
specifics become united by a general concept (Minshew, Meyer, & Goldstein, 2002). Abstraction
deficits have long been documented in ASD (Schneider & Asarnow, 1987; Szatmari, Tuff, J.
Finlayson, & Bartolucci, 1990; Prior & Hoffmann, 1990). More recently, researchers have
investigated two separate skills involving abstraction: concept identification (the easier
recognition of a general pattern or rule created by an external agent) and concept formation (the
harder task of independently creating a schema to organize information). An example of concept
identification would be encountering a new person in a store, noticing that the person is wearing
a name badge and uniform, and thus recognizing that this person fits into a broader concept of a
store employee who is employed to help customers. An example of concept formation would be
forming a concept of strangers (vs. acquaintances or friends), encountering a new person in a
store (who is not necessarily an employee), and placing this person into the category of strangers,
despite the fact that strangers are not externally labelled as such in any way. Concept
identification has been shown to develop late in children with ASD (Ropar & Peebles, 2006;
Shulman, Yirmiya, & Greenbaum, 1995), but there is evidence this ability is intact by
adolescence and young adulthood (Minshew et al., 2002). In contrast, concept formation
impairments exist in childhood and have been shown to persist into adulthood (Minshew et al.,
2002).
Concept formation then is a candidate primary deficit of autism. Support for this is that it
underlies cognitive and behavioral flexibility, which are theorized to be impaired in ASD
(Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009). When an individual faces something new and different (for
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example, a new person), if he/she is able to form a general concept (strangers) and place the new
thing (stranger in the store) within this concept, then the individual can think and behave towards
the new thing in the same way he/she has learned to think and behave to other things grouped by
the concept in the past. If concept formation is impaired, then the individual is unable to benefit
from the generalization of learning regarding the concept to a new case of the concept.
Consequently, when individuals with impaired concept formation are confronted with anything
new or different, they become confused and overwhelmed, and behavioral inflexibility follows.
Autism symptoms of behavioral inflexibility are very consistent with this theoretical pattern
resulting from concept formation deficits (Geurts et al., 2009). Notably, the diagnostic criteria
for ASD include “difficulties adjusting behavior to suit various social contexts” and “inflexible
adherence to routines” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Furthermore, cognitive
inflexibility is associated with severity of autism symptoms, especially restricted, repetitive
behaviors (Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005; South, Ozonoff, & Mcmahon, 2007; Yerys et
al., 2009).
However, despite the centrality of behavioral inflexibility to autism, there are mixed
findings regarding the universality of cognitive inflexibility in ASD (Geurts et al., 2009). This
lack of unitary findings may be due to varied methodology and to inconsistent terminology.
Much of the research on cognitive flexibility in ASD was done using neuropsychological tasks
(e.g., the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) that measure concept identification more than concept
formation (Minshew et al., 2002), although results were often described in terms much broader
than concept identification (e.g., cognitive flexibility [Geurts et al., 2009] or conceptual problem
solving [Rumsey, 1985]). Another confounding factor is that, given that visual-spatial abilities
are intact (or superior) and verbal abilities are impaired in ASD (Minshew et al., 1997), studies

5

utilizing strictly perceptual tasks likely minimized cognitive impairment in ASD, while studies
using strictly verbal tasks likely exaggerated impairment (Geurts et al., 2009). Also, much of the
existing research did not appropriately statistically account for variations in IQ and related
working memory ability that significantly impact performance on cognitive measures; covarying
IQ and working memory in analyses can significantly impact results (e.g., in McLean, Harrison,
Zimak, Joseph, & Morrow, 2014, covarying IQ rendered a correlation between cognitive
flexibility and functional communication nonsignificant). Finally, most of the existing research
does not account for the impact of anxiety on performance for assessor-administered
neuropsychological tests, despite evidence that anxiety is very common in ASD (about 40% of
young people with ASD have a comorbid anxiety disorder; van Steensel, Bögels, & Perrin, 2011)
and can significantly impair performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Ozonoff, 1995b).
Present Study
The purposes of the present study are to investigate: (1) concept identification and
formation in ASD by using a single task that (a) is designed to separate the two abilities, and (b)
involves both verbal and perceptual skills; (2) whether impairment remains after accounting for
IQ, working memory ability, and anxiety, if impairment exists in concept identification or
formation for individuals with ASD; and (3) whether impairment is associated with autism
symptom severity. These questions are appropriately explored in an adolescent (vs. child) sample
given that measures of concept identification and formation are more reliably administered to
adolescents (D.C. Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001), and that the development of concept
identification and formation has reached a relatively stable point by adolescence (Minshew et al.,
2002). We hypothesize that we will: (1) replicate previous findings obtained using factoranalysis-derived measures of concept identification and concept formation that revealed concept
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identification was intact but formation impaired in ASD (Minshew et al., 2002); (2) find that
individuals with ASD will show impairments in concept formation even after accounting for
contributing factors; and (3) find that concept formation ability is associated with severity of
autism symptoms.
Methods
Participants
Participants consisted of 27 adolescents with ASD and 27 typically developing
adolescents (TYP). Consistent with the recent prevalence rates showing that ASD is almost 5
times more common among boys than girls (Baio, 2014), our sample consisted of 21 males and 6
females in each group. They were recruited from the community through the University of
California (UC) Davis MIND Institute’s Subject Tracking System database, the MIND Institute’s
Facebook page, and fliers posted at local public middle and high schools. All participants had a
full-scale IQ > 80 on the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence. The groups were matched
on age, full-scale IQ and nonverbal IQ, with only trend-level differences in verbal IQ (Table 1).
For the participants with ASD, the presence of an autism spectrum disorder was confirmed
through the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Second Edition (ADOS-2), which was
administered by a clinician experienced in working with adolescents with autism and meeting
criteria for research reliability. Of the participants with ASD, 16 completed ADOS-2 Module 3
(mean 11.6, range 8–17) and 11 completed ADOS-2 Module 4 (mean 8.7, range 7–12). All
members of the ASD group also met two out of three additional confirmatory criteria: (1) Social
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) Total score ≥15, (2) community diagnosis, and (3) DSM-5
autism diagnostic checklist interview conducted by an assessor with a parent. Twenty-four of
the 27 ASD group members (89%) met all three confirmatory criteria above and beyond the
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ADOS-2. Two ASD group members were taking stimulant medications, but both completed a
48-hr wash-out period before being assessed; two additional ASD participants were taking
antidepressant medications. Exclusion criteria for participants in the ASD group included
diagnoses of autism with known genetic etiologies and current diagnoses of psychosis. The
ADOS-2 was not administered to typically developing participants to detect autism; however, no
typically developing participant had a Social Communication Questionnaire Total score ≥15, the
screening threshold for autism. Only 15% of the ASD group and 30% of the typically developing
control group identified as Hispanic or Latino. In terms of ethnicity, the ASD group was less
diverse than the control group: 74% White (vs. 56% of controls), 19% identified with more than
one race (vs. 15% of controls), with one Asian participant (vs. 15% of controls), with no
participants identifying as Black (vs. 7% of controls) or Pacific Islander (vs. 4% of controls).
Table 1: Participant Characteristics
ASD (n = 27)
M (SD )
Age in years

14.88 (1.68)

Range

TYP (n = 27)
M (SD )

Range

12.00 - 17.83

14.73 (1.92)

12.08 - 17.67

t

η2

n.s.

Concept Formation

9.00 (3.13)

2 - 16

10.81 (1.96)

7 - 15

2.55 *

0.11

Concept Identification

7.93 (4.03)

1 - 15

9.48 (2.52)

5 - 15

1.70 †

0.05

99.48 (12.25)

77 - 128

105.11 (9.28)

89 - 122

1.90 †

0.07

Nonverbal IQ

103.19 (12.88)

81 - 123

103.59 (10.95)

74 - 122

n.s.

Full-Scale IQ

100.89 (11.10)

82 - 130

104.78 (8.61)

89 - 125

n.s.

Working Memory

98.78 (9.34)

81 - 116

107.48 (11.50)

86 - 128

3.05 **

Test Anxiety

53.00 (9.01)

35 - 70

49.00 (7.70)

35 - 64

Autism Symptoms

75.41 (9.20)

48 - 91

43.30 (7.58)

13 - 58

IQ
Verbal IQ

-1.75 †

0.15
0.06

-14.00 *** 0.79

Note . ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder. TYP = Typically developing. From two-sample t- tests.
*p < 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001; †0.05 ≤ p < 0.10.
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After receiving a complete description of the study, participants gave written consent and
participants’ parents gave written consent. Qualification measures (i.e. IQ and diagnostic
measures) were administered first to ensure eligibility. All measures were administered by a
qualified assessor sitting across a table from the participant. Data was collected as part of a
larger, two-session behavioral and neuroimaging study involving many cognitive measures and
questionnaires that were administered in a variety of pseudo-random orders. All aspects of this
study were conducted in accordance with a protocol approved by the UC Davis Institutional
Review Board.
Measures
Diagnostic. The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Second Edition (ADOS-2; C.
Lord et al., 2012) is the gold-standard diagnostic instrument for ASD as diagnostic validity
(sensitivity and specificity) is excellent, as are the inter-rater and test-retest reliabilities (Gotham,
Risi, Pickles, & Lord, 2006; Catherine Lord et al., 2000). The ADOS-2 is a semi-structured
interactive session that allows an examiner to rate the presence of various ASD symptoms in the
examinee. These ratings are then entered into an algorithm that produces a total score which can
be compared to an empirically-derived cutoff (total score ≥ 7 is indicative of autism). The Social
Communication Questionnaire, Lifetime Version (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) is a
parent-report questionnaire with 40 yes-or-no questions about the child’s social and
communicative behaviors over the child’s lifetime. It is used to screen for autism spectrum
disorders; a total score ≥15 indicates the presence of an autism spectrum disorder with a
sensitivity of 0.86, and specificity of 0.78 (Charman et al., 2007).
Concept identification and concept formation. Delis-Kaplan Executive Function
System (D-KEFS) (Delis et al., 2001). Only the Sorting task from the D-KEFS was used to
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quantify concept identification and concept formation abilities. The Sorting task involves two
parts: Free Sorting, when the examinee sorts cards by concept and describes the concept, and
Sort Recognition, when the assessor sorts cards by concept and the examinee describes the
concept. Both parts are completed for two different card sets of six cards each. The instructions
are to sort the cards into two groups of three cards. Both card sets can be sorted in eight
legitimate ways, with three ways being verbally-based (i.e. based on the meanings of the words
printed on the cards) and the remaining five ways being perceptual-based (i.e. based on the
visual characteristics of the cards). Before beginning the task, the examinee reads a list of words,
including the words on the cards, and is asked to confirm understanding of all words. The
examiner also gives a brief training using a sample card set.
Scoring the examinee’s descriptions of the sorting concepts is subjective, but is based on
extensive guidelines in the examiner’s manual. Scores are age-normed. The Free Sorting
Description score is a measure of concept formation for which the Spearman-Brown-corrected
split-half reliability (ρ) ranged from 0.55 - 0.80 (average 0.68) over the normative sample’s
relevant five age groups (12 to 19 years); for the current sample ρ = 0.70. The Sort Recognition
Description score is a measure of concept identification for which ρ ranged from 0.62 - 0.74
(average 0.69) over the normative sample’s relevant five age groups; for the current sample ρ =
0.72. These reliabilities around 0.70 are on the low end of the good range. Some have criticized
the D-KEFS tests for their low reliability values (Schmidt, 2003); however, many widely-used
neuropsychological tests (including the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test [Heaton, Chelune, Talley,
Kay, & Curtiss, 1993]) do not have reliability coefficients above the desirable 0.80, perhaps
because they are relatively complex and thus involve greater performance variability and/or
measurement error (Dean C. Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Holdnack, 2004).
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IQ. Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II; D. Wechsler
& Hsiao-Pin, 2011). The WASI-II is a valid, brief measure of full-scale IQ (FSIQ) involving four
subtests: two measuring nonverbal IQ (Matrix Reasoning and Block Design), and two measuring
verbal IQ (Vocabulary and Similarities). Unlike the WISC-IV, the WASI-II does not incorporate
a working memory component. The WASI-II has excellent psychometric properties, including
test-retest reliability of 0.96 for full-scale IQ.
Working memory. Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning, Second Edition
(WRAML2; Sheslow & Adams, 2003). Verbal Working Memory and Symbolic Working
Memory subtests were administered in order to calculate an age-normed Working Memory Index
score. The Verbal Working Memory subtest requires the participant to recall and manipulate
words, while the Symbolic Working Memory subtest requires that they recall and manipulate
letters and numbers. For the present sample’s age range, the Working Memory Index has a
conservative Cronbach’s α reliability estimate of 0.89 - 0.91.
Test anxiety. Behavioral Assessment System for Children, Second Edition: Self Report
of Personality, Adolescent Form (BASC-2: SRP-A; Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004). The BASC-2
is a self-report questionnaire with 176 questions designed to facilitate the identification of a
variety of emotional and behavioral disorders in children. Test Anxiety, one of the BASC-2
content scales, was used. Scores are age- and gender- normed. Seven items, three true-false and
four scored on a 4-point Likert-type frequency scale, load onto Test Anxiety. These seven
questions ask about the individual’s worry and fear about tests, regardless of the degree of
preparation or confidence (e.g., “No matter how much I study for a test, I am afraid I will fail.”).
For the present sample’s age range, Test Anxiety has an acceptable α of 0.67 - 0.71.
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Autism symptoms. Social Responsiveness Scale, Second Edition (SRS-2; Constantino,
2012). The SRS-2 is a parent-report questionnaire with 65 questions designed to quantify autistic
behavior over the previous six months. Scores are age- and gender- normed. Items are scored on
a 4-point Likert-type frequency scale, ranging from “not true” to “almost always true.” Questions
cover content ranging from social awareness and social communication to restricted interests and
repetitive behaviors. The total T-score is a measure of overall autism symptomatology and has an
excellent α of 0.95, and test-retest reliability of 0.88 - 0.95. A total T-score of 76 or higher is
considered severe and strongly associated with a clinical diagnosis of ASD.
Results
Are Individuals with ASD Impaired in Concept Identification or Formation?
Data analysis. To explore group differences on concept identification and concept
formation, we conducted one-way ANOVAs with diagnosis as the independent factor. Normality
and homoscedasticity of these two variables were tested using a Shapiro-Wilk test (Thode, 2002)
and Levene’s test (Levene, 1961) respectively. Both variables failed Levene’s test of
homogeneity of variances; accordingly, we confirmed the ANOVA results through a BrownForsythe F test (Brown & Forsythe, 1974). There was no missing data. Outliers (> 2IQR from
the mean) were present only in the ASD group for the concept formation variable: there was one
low outlier and one high. These outliers were preserved as they seemed to represent valid scores
(the low score was associated with a low IQ; the high score was associated with a high IQ).
Results. Compared to controls, individuals with ASD exhibited significantly worse
concept formation, F(1, 52) = 6.53, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.11, while their concept identification trended
towards being significantly worse, F(1, 52) = 2.90, p = 0.095, η2 = 0.05 (Table 1). Our
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hypothesis was partly borne out in that concept formation in ASD was impaired, but concept
identification cannot be said to be intact given the trend-level difference.
Is Concept Formation Ability Explained by Non-Diagnostic Factors?
Data analysis. To evaluate our second hypothesis, we tested a linear regression model of
concept formation. We used Type II sums of squares which eliminates the effect of predictor
order in the model. To examine associations between the potential predictor variables –
nonverbal IQ, verbal IQ, working memory, and test anxiety – and the criterion variable of
concept formation, we first conducted two-tailed Pearson correlations (Table 2). All variables
had a p < 0.1 unadjusted association with concept formation and so all were entered, along with a
dichotomous variable representing diagnosis of ASD. Terms that did not add significantly to this
initial model were eliminated and the resulting model was a final parsimonious model.
Interaction terms between diagnosis and all significant predictors were added and tested in this
parsimonious model. Normality of all predictor variables was confirmed using a Shapiro-Wilk
test (Thode, 2002); multivariate normality was confirmed using a Doornick-Hansen omnibus test
(Doornik & Hansen, 2008). Collinearity was not problematic (VIF for all variables < 2) (O’brien,
2007).
Results. The final parsimonious model accounted for 35% of the variance in concept
formation (R2adj = 0.35) and showed that the strongest predictor of concept formation was verbal
IQ (β = 0.41), followed by nonverbal IQ (β = 0.28) and diagnosis of ASD (β = -0.22; Table 3).
Even after accounting for verbal and nonverbal IQ, diagnosis of ASD was associated with
slightly more than a one point decrease in concept formation scaled score (B = -1.21; scaled
score SD = 3). Test anxiety and working memory were not significant predictors of concept
formation ability; all interaction terms were also non-significant and so not retained. Again, our
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Table 2: Pearson Correlations
Verbal IQ
ASD
Nonverbal IQ

0.18

Working Memory

0.50

Test Anxiety

0.09

Concept Formation

0.47

TYP

ALL

0.09
**

0.37

0.48

ASD

TYP

Working Memory
ALL

ASD

TYP

Test Anxiety

ALL

ASD

TYP

ALL

0.15
†

0.03
*

Nonverbal IQ

0.48

***

0.00
*

0.51

***

0.32

0.19

-0.22

-0.47

0.44

*

0.21

*

0.23

†

-0.32

*

-0.04

-0.30

0.34

*

0.30

0.24

†

-0.28

*

0.36

**

-0.04

0.02

-0.23

**

Note. ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder; TYP = Typically developing; ALL = ASD and TYP combined.
*p < 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001; †0.05 ≤ p < 0.10.
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Table 3: Linear Regression Models

Model

Predictor

R

R 2 R 2 adj

B

β

p -value

0.62 0.38 0.32

Initial
Diagnosis

-1.26

-0.23

0.072

Verbal IQ

0.10

0.40

0.004

Nonverbal IQ

0.07

0.29

0.021

Working Memory

0.01

0.02

0.888

Test Anxiety

0.02

0.06

0.663

Diagnosis

-1.21

-0.22

0.058

Verbal IQ

0.10

0.41

0.001

Nonverbal IQ

0.06

0.28

0.017

Parsimonious

†

**
*

0.62 0.38 0.35

Note : Criterion is Concept Formation.
*p < 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001; †0.05 ≤ p < 0.10.

†

***
*

hypothesis was partly borne out in that individuals with ASD showed impairment in concept
formation even after accounting for contributing factors, yet only at trend-level significance (p =
0.058).
Is Concept Identification or Formation Associated with Autism Symptoms?
We conducted two-tailed Pearson correlations between SRS-2 Total scores and concept
formation and identification in the ASD group. In contradiction to our hypothesis, no
correlations were significant. We conducted post-hoc partial correlations of SRS-2 Total scores
with concept formation and identification while covarying for verbal and nonverbal IQ. These
post-hoc analyses also yielded no significant correlations.
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Power Analyses
Power analyses revealed that power for the ANOVA and regression analyses is low
(~0.7), while power for the correlational analysis is high (0.99). The focus of the first two
analyses, namely the diagnostic group difference on Free Sort (i.e. concept formation) scores,
was estimated to be of a medium effect size. This estimation is based on two studies. The first
study administered the D-KEFS Sorting task to older, high-functioning children with autism and
found that they differed significantly (Cohen’s d = 0.62) from their typical peers on an average
of Free Sort and Sort Recognition scores (McLean et al., 2014). The second study was a study of
adolescents and young adults with high-functioning autism that found they differed significantly
(Cohen’s d = 0.68) from their typical peers on a different measure of concept formation
(Minshew et al., 2002). For the correlational analysis, the relationship between concept
formation and autism symptoms was estimated to be of a large effect size. This estimation was
based on the McLean et al., 2014 study mentioned above that found an average of Free Sort and
Sort Recognition scores correlated with autism symptoms (specifically, social communication
deficits) at r = 0.54. Since Sort Recognition measures concept identification which is theorized to
be less impaired in autism, this correlation which includes Sort Recognition may be an
underestimate; however, if it is an overestimate, the present sample has acceptable power to
detect a milder correlation of r = 0.27. Power analyses were conducted using G*Power version
3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009); all other statistical analyses were implemented
using SPSS version 23.0 (IBM Corporation, 2013).
Discussion
The current study confirmed a previous finding (Minshew et al., 2002) that there is a
dissociation between concept identification and formation in ASD, with identification being non-
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significantly impaired in our sample and formation being significantly impaired in our sample.
This dissociation is notable because it is not found in other clinical groups that have difficulty
with abstraction (e.g., individuals with schizophrenia or dementia [Goldstein, 1998]). After
statistically controlling for verbal and nonverbal IQ, this impairment in concept formation
retained a trend-level significance, suggesting that concept formation deficits exist across levels
of cognitive functioning in ASD. Regressing out IQ for our IQ-matched samples was a
conservative step; however, as the change in significance of our results illustrates, IQ matching is
not appropriately interpreted as wholly accounting for contributions of IQ.
Not surprisingly given that our concept formation task involved verbal descriptions of
card sorts, verbal IQ was a strong predictor of successful concept formation, and a stronger
predictor than nonverbal IQ. This finding of the significant role of verbal IQ confirms previous
findings that performance on the D-KEFS Sorting task is associated with language abilities in
ASD (McLean et al., 2014). Surprisingly though, working memory and test anxiety were not
significant predictors of successful concept formation. A measure of working memory is
included along with measures of processing speed, verbal comprehension (verbal IQ), and
perceptual reasoning (nonverbal IQ) in the full-scale IQ score of the commonly-administered
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Edition (WISC-IV; David Wechsler, 2003).
The fact that working memory is not a significant predictor, but verbal and nonverbal IQ are,
emphasizes the value in investigating increasingly specific constructs (i.e., concept identification
and formation instead of general abstraction; verbal IQ, nonverbal IQ, and working memory
instead of general full-scale IQ). Regarding test anxiety, it is possible that our sample was not
anxious enough in order to detect an effect: in the entire sample only one ASD participant (4% of
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the ASD group) reported test anxiety in the clinically-significant range (Reynolds & Kamphaus,
2004).
Most surprising was our finding that concept formation ability was not associated with a
measure autism symptomatology. This result contradicts a previous finding that a combined
measure of concept identification and formation correlated with autism symptom severity in
individuals with ASD and average intelligence (McLean et al., 2014). Although our sample was
high-functioning, the lack of an association is not due to a restriction of range: the standardized
scores on measures concept formation ability and autism symptom severity spanned a range of
over four standard deviations. Our finding weakens the theoretical significance of a concept
formation deficit in ASD, and suggests it is not a primary deficit in ASD.
This study has various important limitations. First, this study has low power to detect
some effects of interest. Future studies should employ larger samples to increase power. Second,
the constructs involved in this study (e.g., concept formation ability) were all operationalized
using only one measure, which weakens the construct validity. Third, while the present study
accounted for the effects of IQ, working memory ability, and test anxiety, there are other
potential confounds that are common in the autism population and that impact performance on
neuropsychological tests (e.g. poor motivation [Koegel, Singh, & Koegel, 2010], inattention
[Gjevik, Eldevik, Fjæran-Granum, & Sponheim, 2010], and processing speed deficits [OliverasRentas, Kenworthy, Iii, Martin, & Wallace, 2011]) that should be explored in future studies.
Fourth, all assessors were aware of each participant’s diagnostic status, which introduces the
possibility that assessors’ expectations of how group members would perform influenced actual
performance. Fifth, the present high-functioning sample is not representative of the autism
population in severity of impairment. Although it is not possible to administer the D-KEFS
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Sorting task to low-functioning/minimally-verbal individuals with ASD, future studies should
utilize other measures to explore concept formation impairments across a wider range of the
autism spectrum. Sixth and lastly, given the small sample and the context of data collection, the
results may be clouded by random factors that were not accounted for (e.g., perhaps some
participants’ performance was impacted by the time of day of administration).
Conclusion
We investigated concept identification and formation abilities in high-functioning
adolescents with ASD utilizing a card-sorting task designed to separate these two abilities (DKEFS Sorting task). The results of this study confirm previous findings that adolescents with
ASD, compared to their typically-developing peers, are significantly impaired in concept
formation, yet not significantly impaired in concept identification. Notably, statistically
controlling for verbal and nonverbal IQ attenuated to trend level the statistical significance of the
observed concept formation impairment. Working memory capacity and test anxiety were not
significant predictors of concept formation ability. Furthermore, concept formation ability was
not associated with parent-reported autism symptomatology. These results cast doubt on
diminished concept formation ability as a primary deficit of autism; however, they are best
interpreted as inconclusive given our small sample size and limited power to detect effects
involving complex cognitive constructs such as concept formation.
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